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While there is considerable literature in various legal publications
discussing the usage of division orders in the oil and gas industry,1 most
of it has been written from the vantage point of the purchaser of produc-
tion. This is only natural because purchasers are more organized than
royalty owners and deal on a daily basis with problems that arise from
the purchase of oil and gas production. However, royalty owners are
increasingly more sophisticated and cognizant of their rights and lately
have become much more litigious. This Article will analyze the rights of
royalty owners (royalty owners will be used interchangeably with lessors
* Partner, Gerald, Brand, Watters, Cox & Hemleben, Jackson, Mississippi. B.S. 1971, Mis-
sissippi State University; J.D. 1975, University of Mississippi. This Article is based upon a paper
presented at a Mississippi Oil and Gas Law Seminar sponsored by the Mississippi Oil and Gas
Lawyers Association and Mississippi Association of Petroleum Landmen in Jackson, Mississippi, on
April 21, 1989.
1. Bailey, Division Orders, 18 INST. ON MIN. L. 21 (1971) [hereinafter Bailey]; Bounds, Divi-
sion Orders, 5 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx'N 91 (1954) [hereinafter Bounds]; Boyd, Crude Oil
Purchasing-Its Title Opinions and Division Orders, 18 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 233 (1965)
[hereinafter Boyd]; Brannan, Division Orders, 8 E. MIN. L. INsT. 12-1 (1987) [hereinafter Brannan];
Browder, Estoppel, Waiver, and Ratification Affecting Mineral and Leasehold Rights, 10 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 139 (1965); Cubbage, Royalty Problems Management, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INT. 691 (1983); Ethridge, Oil and Gas Division Orders, 19 Miss. L.J. 127 (1948) [hereinafter
Ethridge]; Gregg, Title Examination and Division Orders, 19 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 29
(1968) [hereinafter Gregg]; Hollimon, Division Orders-A Primer, 34 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAx'N 313 (1983) [hereinafter Hollimon]; Hooper & Sehleier, Current Use and Effect of Division and
Transfer Orders, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 531 (1977) [hereinafter Hooper & Schleier]; Knowlton & Morrow,
Division Orders: Contract, Distribution Mechanism, and Curative Tool, in INST. ON OIL AND GAS
AGREEMENTS 12-1 (1983); Lange, The Production of Oil and Gas and Some of the Problems Reached
by It, 22 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 113 (1971); Lear, First Purchaser Suspense Accounts, 33
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1 (1988); Pierce, Resolving Division Order Disputes: A Conceptual
Approach, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3-1 (1990) [hereinafter Pierce]; Rain, A Further Look at
Division Orders and Problems in Accounting and Payment of Proceeds from Oil and Gas, 8 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 69 (1963) [hereinafter Rain]; Twenhafel, Oil-Gas Division Orders: Their Origin,
Varieties, and Usage, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1479 (1982) [hereinafter Twenhafel].
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throughout this Article) as sellers of production and how those rights
may be affected by the execution of oil and gas division orders.
II. HISTORY OF THE DIVISION ORDER
There is no authoritative source for the origin of the division order
in any of the literature on the subject. Division orders apparently were in
common use by the turn of the century.2 We do know that the division
order originated in the early days of the oil industry when oil was the
primary product sold. It was sold to third-party purchasers who were
neither operators nor owners of any of the oil and gas interests and who
were in the business of buying crude oil as a raw material for the refining
business.' Crude oil at that time was marketed primarily through pipe-
lines and later railroads and eventually trucks which purchased the oil at
the well and hauled for hire the production to market. Generally, the
purchasers would assume the responsibility of distributing the proceeds
to the owners.' The purchasers developed the division order to provide
protection from liability in making distribution of proceeds from produc-
tion.5 The nature of the relationship, between a third-party purchaser
making payment to working interest owners and royalty owners, should
be kept in mind when reading many of the early cases construing division
orders as this relationship is often not clearly set out.
Over the years, the nature of selling and marketing production has
changed. In today's typical marketing arrangement, the operator will
often be the party responsible for distributing proceeds from the sale of
production. Frequently, several working interest owners will separately
market production. Thus, royalty owners may receive payments from
several different parties under several different division orders.6
III. DEFINITION OF DIVISION ORDER
There is no unanimity as to precisely what a division order is or how
to define one. While there is a general consensus that the purpose of a
2. Nonamaker v. Amos, 76 N.E. 949 (Ohio 1905); Childers v. Neely, 47 W. Va. 70, 34 S.E.
828 (1899).
3. Hooper & Schleier, supra note 1, at 532. See generally Twenhafel, supra note 1, at 1483-89.
4. Hooper & Schleier, supra note 1, at 532.
5. Hooper & Schleier, supra note 1, at 532.
6. This type of situation can give rise to an array of problems. See Smith, Gas Marketing By
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division order is to facilitate the sale of oil and/or gas to a purchaser,7
there is considerable confusion over the legal relationships of the parties
to a division order,8 and the division order's effect as a legal instrument.9
It has been defined by courts and commentators as:
[T]he contract under which the production is purchased or accepted
for transportation by the pipe line company. 10
[T]he operative instrument of transfer, whether called a contract or
not, and until revoked is binding on the parties, who thereunder de-
clare their present ability and intent to transfer, sell, or otherwise dis-
pose of the oil to the pipeline, and their entitlement to payment for this
same transfer.1
[A] continuing order or direction to the purchaser to receive the pro-
duction and account for it on the terms stated to the persons who exe-
cute the division order in the proportions set opposite the seller's name
until some different direction is given. 12
[A]n order to the person or company purchasing the production from
the land directing that person or company to make payment for the
value of the products taken in the proportions set out in the division
order. 13
It has been described variously as an executed, bilateral contract, 14 a
unilateral contract,15 an element of a contract, 16 and not really a con-
tract. 1 7 The differences in definitions and descriptions stem partially
from the fact that there are various types of division orders in existence,
and that the relationship of the parties determines the type of division
order used. There is no standard division order and the relationship of
the parties must always be considered when interpreting these instru-
ments. The courts have not always clearly understood this. While there
is no authoritative definition of a division order, it is, broadly stated, the
7. See Brannan, supra note 1, at 12-3; Gregg, supra note 1, at 29-30; Hollimon, supra note 1, at
313-14.
8. See Ethridge, supra note 1, at 130 ("The courts... [by 1948] have not formulated a clear
and precise analysis of an order's contractual nature and the juridical facts occurring subsequent to
its execution."). They still haven't some 40 years later. See Smith, Royalty Issues: Take-or-Pay
Claims and Division Orders, 24 TULSA L.L 509, 535 (1989) ("There are too many cases saying too
many things without clearly articulating the legal theories used.").
9. Compare Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 233 Kan. 544, 664 P.2d 1335 (1983), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 953 (1985) with Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
10. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 183 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944 writ ref'd.).
11. Pan Ain. Petroleum Corp. v. Long, 340 F.2d 211, 223 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
926 (1965).
12. Gregg, supra note 1, at 29-30.
13. Bounds, supra note 1, at 91.
14. See Ethridge, supra note 1, at 131 & n.10 and cases cited therein.
15. Ethridge, supra note 1, at 133.
16. Wolfe v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 83 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1936) (by implication).
17. Hooper & Schleier, supra note 1, at 533.
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instrument through which an interest owner authorizes another party to
make distribution of the proceeds from the sale of production.
IV. TYPES OF DIVISION ORDERS
There are three basic types of division orders. The first type is the
standard third-party purchaser division order. This is a division order
from both lessor and lessee directed to a third-party purchaser who as-
sumes the responsibility for disbursing proceeds from production directly
to the royalty owner and the working interest owner for their respective
shares of proceeds. This was the form of division order that was stan-
dard in the early days of the industry." These division orders will gener-
ally require that the owners furnish abstracts of title for examination by
the purchaser's attorney. However, this is rarely demanded anymore be-
cause purchasers over the years have come to rely on title opinions from
outside attorneys. This type of division order sets out the basic terms of
the contract for sale and purchase between the parties in the absence of a
written sales contract. Generally, a third-party purchaser will initially
purchase the oil under an oral agreement and division orders will be is-
sued subsequently. This type of division order was established primarily
to protect the purchaser of production for payments made to the interest
owners and is generally used only for the sale of oil.
The second type is an indemnity division order. This is a division
order from the lessee to the purchaser, whereupon the purchaser pays the
lessee for 100% of the production and the lessee assumes the responsibil-
ity for disbursing royalties. This type of division order has become much
more common in recent years as the method of marketing oil and gas has
evolved. The burdens of ascertaining title, reconciling accounts and ef-
fecting settlements of proceeds for the royalty owners are shifted from
the third-party purchaser to the lessee/operator. When the lessee/opera-
tor is selling 100% of the production, there will generally be a written
sales contract between the lessee/operator and the purchaser. One com-
mentator has noted that the practice of the industry has relegated this
type of division order to nothing more than a stipulation of interest and
that in all probability, the division order has no legal, practical or logical
role, except for stipulations of interest among separate sellers.19
The third type of division order is the lessee/purchaser division or-
der. This type of division order is a direction from the royalty owner to
18. Twenhafel, supra note 1, at 1498-99.
19. Twenhafel, supra note 1, at 1500.
[Vol. 25:571
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the lessee to assume responsibility for disbursing proceeds to the royalty
owner. In most instances, lessees have simply adopted the forms of
third-party purchaser division orders, inserting their names in place of
the names of third-party purchasers.20 The division orders have not been
properly crafted to distinguish between the dual role of the lessee/pur-
chaser and the solitary role of the third-party purchaser. This type of
division order has been in common use in connection with sales of gas for
many years and is now probably the most frequently used division order
for both oil and gas.
In addition to the three basic types of division orders described
above, a distinction should be made between division orders governing
the sale of oil and those governing the sale of natural gas. Sometimes
they will be issued separately, and sometimes one division order will
cover both products.
V. RIGHTS OF ROYALTY OWNERS As SELLERS OF PRODUCTION
A. The Lease As the Basic Contract
As between a lessor and lessee, the lease is the basic contract for the
sale of the royalty owner's share of production and contains the terms
that control this sale.21 Standard form leases generally provide different
rights to royalty owners for oil production sold as opposed to gas produc-
tion. Usually, the lease will provide that the lessor reserves a fractional
share of the oil which the lessee agrees to deliver to the credit of the
lessor in the pipeline or other connection to the lessee's well. Frequently,
the oil royalty clause will authorize the lessee to purchase the lessor's
share of oil royalty at the posted market price. In contrast, the standard
gas royalty clause reserves to the lessor a fractional share of the proceeds
or market value of the gas produced, sold or used. Under this type of
reservation, title to all of the gas vests in the lessee and the lessor has only
a monetary claim.22
The lease form most commonly in use in the Gulf Coast region to-
day contains the following provisions for royalty on oil and gas:
As royalty, lessee covenants and agrees: (a) To deliver to the credit of
lessor, in the pipe line to which lessee may connect its wells, the equal
one-eighth part of all oil produced and saved by lessee from said land,
or from time to time, at the option of lessee, to pay lessor the average
20. Twenhafel, supra note 1, at 1501.
21. Rain, supra note 1, at 77; Twenhafel, supra note 1, at 1503-04.
22. See Gregg, supra note 1, at 31.
1990]
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posted market price of such one-eighth part of such oil at the wells as
of the day it is run to the pipe line or storage tanks, lessor's interest, in
either case, to bear one-eighth of the cost of treating oil to render it
marketable pipe line oil.
(b) To pay lessor on gas and casinghead gas produced from said land
(1) when sold by lessee, one-eighth of the amount realized by lessee,
computed at the mouth of the well, or (2) when used by lessee off said
land or in the manufacture of gasoline or other products, the market
value, at the mouth of the well, of one-eighth of such gas and casing-
head gas.23
As can be seen by an examination of the above clauses, the lessor has a
right to take oil royalty in kind because the lessee agrees to deliver oil to
the credit of lessor to the stated point, but as to gas agrees to pay lessor
only for the gas sold or used. While there are many variants in oil and
gas royalty clauses in the various leases still in common use today, virtu-
ally all standard form leases contain the same distinction in treatment of
royalty for oil and royalty for gas. Most modem forms, such as the one
above, give an option to the lessee to pay for royalty oil. In addition, it is
generally held that the lessee has not only the right, but the obligation to
market the oil on the lessor's behalf should he refuse to take his royalty
oil in kind.2 4
B. Necessity of Execution of Division Order As Prerequisite for
Receiving Payment
When the lessee is also the purchaser and has issued division orders,
it appears to be the consensus of those who have addressed the issue that
there is no necessity for the royalty owner to execute a division order
prior to receiving payment for royalties unless the lease specifically re-
quires it.25 There really should be little dissent from this proposition.
The lease is a binding contract between lessor and lessee which estab-
lishes the obligation of the lessee to account to his lessor for royalty. The
lease contract establishes the rights of the parties and contains the pro-
tections that are necessary for the lessee in his dual role as purchaser and
lessee.
23. PRODUCERS FORM 88 (9-70) WITH POOLING PROVISION (Hederman Bros. Jackson, Miss.)
(for use in Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida).
24. Lear, supra note 1, at 17-6 (citing Wolfe v. Teu-Ps Co., 83 F.2d 425, 430 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 553 (1936), and Cook v. Tompkins, 713 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1986)); Pierce, supra note 1, at 3-7.
25. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Page Farms, Inc., 287 Ark. 304, 698 S.W.2d 791 (1985); Boyd, supra
note 1, at 256; Brannan, supra note 1, at 12-11; Holliman, supra note 1, at 332.
[Vol. 25:571
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There is a sharp division of opinion as to the necessity of the execu-
tion of a division order by royalty owners as a prerequisite to receiving
payment for production sold to a third-party purchaser. Advocacy
groups for royalty owners vehemently proclaim that there is no necessity
for a royalty owner to execute to anyone a division order that is anything
more than a stipulation of interest.26 Purchasing companies and their
attorneys are adamant that there is no obligation for a third-party pur-
chaser to pay any royalty owner in the absence of an executed division
order acceptable to the purchaser.2 7
Purchasers argue that the purchaser is a stranger to the lease and
has no contractual relationship with the royalty owner except through its
division orders. They contend that they are lawfully in possession of the
oil by virtue of its delivery from the lessee as agent for the royalty owner,
but that no payment is due until a division order is executed pursuant to
the custom and usage in the industry. Royalty owners generally respond
that they cannot be forced to sign a division order which might diminish
their rights because they are not required to do so by their leases.
There appear to be only two reported decisions on the issue of
whether a royalty owner can be required to sign a division order to a
third-party purchaser in order to receive royalty payments. The cases
are split and neither may have great influence outside its jurisdiction.
The Ohio Supreme Court in Blausey v. Stein,28 confronted a situa-
tion in which a lessor had sued her lessee to cancel a lease based on
cessation of production and failure to pay royalty. The lessor had re-
fused to sign division orders as a prerequisite to receiving royalty pay-
ments. The court disposed of the issue of the division orders in the
following language:
A division order is a direction and authorization to the purchaser
of oil to distribute the purchase price in a specified manner. Its pur-
pose is to assure that the purchaser pays only those parties who are
entitled to payment .... By signing the division order, the lessor is
simply verifying that he has a right to royalty payments.
The record indicates that appellant has refused to sign a division
26. The National Association of Royalty Owners (NARO) has long advocated this position and
strongly supported the royalty owner plaintiffs in Hull v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co., 60 OKLA.
B.J. 2358 (October 7, 1989) (1989 WL 109791).
27. See Appellant's Brief in Chief at 10-11, and Brief of Amicus Curiae Koch Oil Co. at 7-12,
Hull v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co., 60 OKLA. BJ. 2358 (October 7, 1989) (1989 WL 109791)
(No. 71, 179); See also Boyd, supra note 1, at 262-63; Brannan, supra note 1, at 12-12 to -13; Holli-
man, supra note 1, at 332-33; Twenhafel, supra note 1, at 1508-10.
28. 61 Ohio St. 2d 264, 400 N.E.2d 408 (1980). The opinion does not explicitly state that the
division orders were tendered by a third-party purchaser but implies as much.
1990]
7
Bondurant: Royalty Owner Rights under Division Orders
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
order for the oil sold by appellee in 1975. Because of her refusal, the
purchaser has not tendered payment for accrued royalties.... We
hold that the requirement that appellant execute a division order prior
to receiving her royalty payments does not contravene any specific pro-
vision of the lease, and is not such a burden that it can be considered
an attempted modification of the lease.2
9
The court in Blausey failed to cite authorities or support its holding
with reasoned arguments. The opinion ignores a large body of law which
holds that a lessor may be doing far more by executing a division order
than "simply verifying that he has a right to royalty payments."3 Thus,
it is doubtful that Blausey will have much effect outside the State of
Ohio.
The second case, Hull v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co.,3 was re-
cently decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in favor of the royalty
owner. In Sun, the royalty owners had clear and undisputed title to both
the surface and the mineral interests to the property in question. They
executed a lease with a royalty provision requiring the lessee to deliver
the equal one-fourth part of all oil produced and saved from the leased
premises to the lessors' credit. The lessors made no independent arrange-
ments to sell their oil or take their oil in kind. Their lessee, on his own
behalf and as agent for the lessors, entered into an oral sale and purchase
agreement with Sun for the sale and purchase of oil from the well. 32 Sun
contended that long-standing custom and practice in the industry im-
plied that all owners in the well would have to sign a standard industry
division order acceptable to Sun before being entitled to receive payment
for production. 33 The lessors refused to sign the standard form division
order tendered by Sun. In response to objections voiced by the lessors,
Sun prepared a new division order.3a The lessors refused to sign the re-
vised division order and tendered to Sun a stipulation and division of
interest form. Sun rejected this substituted "division order" because it
failed to specify the terms of the purchase to Sun's satisfaction and did
29. Id. at 267, 400 N.E.2d at 410-11 (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 267, 400 N.E.2d at 410. See, eg., Murdock v. Pure-Lively Energy 1981-A, Ltd., 108
N.M. 575, 775 P.2d 1292 (1989) (royalty owner by execution of division order waived any claim to
interest on suspended funds); Puckett v. First City Nat. Bank, 702 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-East-
land 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (division order changed basis for calculating royalty from market value
to proceeds). See infra note 129.
31. 60 OKLA. B.J. 2358 (October 7, 1989) (1989 WL 109791).
32. Sun is a third-party purchaser and is in no way affiliated with the lessee of the royalty
owners.
33. See Appellant's Brief in Chief, supra note 27, at 10-12.
34. See Appellant's Brief in Chief, supra note 27, at 5.
[Vol. 25:571
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not warrant title to the oil. Sun suspended all payments to the lessors for
their royalty oil, and the lessors sued.
The trial court split the baby in half, holding that the lessors did not
have to execute either of the division orders tendered by Sun to be legally
entitled to the suspended proceeds, but that the stipulation of interest
submitted to Sun was insufficient to require Sun to pay.35 The trial court
listed ten terms that a division order must contain to entitle a royalty
owner to receive payment and held that the royalty owners must be paid
upon the execution of the "court approved" division order.36 Both sides
appealed.
Sun framed the major issue in the case as follows:
This case only involves the situation where a third-party oil purchaser
with no prior relationship to the royalty owner seeks to require the
royalty owner to execute a division order prior to being entitled to
receive payment for proceeds of production, all in accordance with the
oil purchase contract and the custom of the oil purchasing industry.
37
Sun argued that the lessee, as agent of the lessors, has implied authority
to sell the royalty owner's oil and to include as part of the contract of sale
the requirement that the royalty owner execute a division order to the oil
purchaser.38 The division order would include terms and provisions ac-
ceptable to the purchaser so long as said terms were neither unlawful nor
unconscionable and were consistent with standard industry practice and
usage of the trade.39
35. Hull v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co., No. 86-327 (Dist. Ct. of Seminole County, Okla.)
36. The terms that the Oklahoma trial court felt were essential to a division order are:
a. Purchaser's name and address
b. Effective date of purchase
c. Lease/unit/property name
d. Description of property
e. Warranty
f. Reference to payments in accordance with federal and state laws
g. Notice of change of ownership
h. Division of interest
i. Name, address and tax I.D. number of interest owner
j. Signature of interest owner
Id.
37. Appellant's Brief in Chief, supra note 27, at 13.
38. Appellant's Brief in Chief, supra note 27, at 6-8.
39. Appellant's Brief in Chief, supra note 27, at 20-22. The test proposed by Sun would subject
royalty owners to treatment as merchants under the Uniform Commercial Code and impute to them
knowledge of custom and usage in the industry, something other courts have recently refused to do.
See, e.g., Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 236 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Page Farms, Inc., 287 Ark. 304, 698 S.W.2d
791,792 (1985). But see Wolfe v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 83 F.2d 438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 553 (1936); Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 553 (1936).
1990]
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The lessors countered that their lease established the terms under
which their royalty payments were due and the scope of the authority
granted the lessee to sell to the purchaser the royalty owner's oil.40 They
agreed that the purchaser had a valid contract to purchase 100% of the
production from the well pursuant to its contract with the lessee. They
contended that there was no need for a separate contract between the
purchaser and the royalty owner. Because the purchaser assumed the
obligation to pay royalty owners directly, it must comply with the lease
provisions in making this payment.41 The royalty owners then argued
that the lessee cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly; the lessee
"cannot require the lessor to execute a division order and cannot, by
entering into an oil purchase contract, give the purchaser the right to
require the lessor to execute one."'42
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, by a vote of 6-3, ruled in favor of
the royalty owners on rather narrow grounds, holding inter alia that
under title 52, section 540 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the failure to exe-
cute a division order does not justify suspension of royalties in the ab-
sence of unmarketable title, and that the agent lessee could not bind the
principal-lessor to a trade usage requiring execution of a division order as
it was against public policy.4 The court construed the Oklahoma statute
to allow suspension of royalty payments only when a legitimate question
as to marketability of title existed.' The court found that the statute
required payment of royalty proceeds within the stated time if title were
marketable, and therefore, that requiring the execution of a division or-
der as a condition precedent to payment violated the terms of the
statute.45
40. Appellees/Cross-Appellants' Answer Brief and Brief in Chief at 21, Hull v. Sun Refining
and Marketing Co., 60 OKLA. B.J. 2358 (Oct. 7, 1989) (1989 WL 109791) (No. 71,179).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Hull v. Sun Refining and Marketing Co., 60 OKLA. B.J. 2358, 2361 (Oct. 7, 1989) (1989
WL 109791).
44. Id.
45. Id The court noted that title 52, section 540 of the Oklahoma Statutes was amended effec-
tive July 1, 1989, and refused to express an opinion concerning the effect the amendment might have
on future cases questioning execution of division orders as a precedent to payment. Id. at 2363 n. 7.
The dissent felt that the amendment will require division orders to be executed in the future in
Oklahoma for a person to be legally entitled to receive payment. The dissenters declared that the
effect of the majority opinion is to create a four year "window" (1985-89) during which the law
deviates from preceding and succeeding law. Id. at 2364. The amendment added the following
language:
B. A division order is an instrument for the purpose of directing the distribution of pro-
ceeds from the sale of oil, gas, casinghead gas or other related hydrocarbons which war-
rants in writing the division of interest and the name, address and tax indentification
[Vol. 25:571
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Though the court's holding was in favor of the royalty owners, the
opinion is not without fodder for future fights by purchasers in jurisdic-
tions which have no payment statutes similar to Oklahoma's. The court
found that under the common law, it was a recognized custom and usage
of the oil and gas industry that royalty holders execute division orders
before receiving royalty payments." The court also noted that division
orders are binding upon royalty owners until revoked, even though the
division order may abrogate or alter rights under the lease.' The court
reasoned that under these circumstances, purchasers could force acquies-
cence to conditions unfavorable to royalty owners by threatening to with-
hold payments under a pretext of complying with custom and usage.4"
The court held that such custom and usage was repugnant to the express
provisions of the Oklahoma statute and, therefore, void.4 9
The court only briefly focused on the issue of the lessee's agency
authority. The court brushed aside this issue, stating that the power of
an agent to bind its principal "does not extend to customs and usages
which are either illegal or contrary to public policy."50 'The court found
the requirement that a lessor execute a division order before receiving
royalty payment to be violative of the public policy as announced in title
52, section 540 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and any such custom and us-
age could not survive its enactment. 5'
The court's holding is grounded in its interpretation of who is "le-
gally entitled" to receive royalty payments under the Oklahoma statute.
Finding that anyone whose title is marketable is legally entitled to receive
royalty payments, the court disposes of the other issues based on its stat-
utory interpretation.5 2 Thus, the court's opinion is of limited analytical
number of such interest owner with a provision requiring notice of change of ownership. A
division order is executed to enable the purchaser of the production from the leasehold to
make remittance directly to the interest owners for their royalty interest, and is not in-
tended to and does not relieve the lessee of any liabilities or obligations under the oil and
gas lease. A division order which varies the terms of any oil and gas lease is invalid to the
extent of the variance unless those changes have been previously agreed to by the affected
parties. This subsection shall only apply to division orders executed on or after July 1,
1989.
S.107, 42nd Leg., 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 241, codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 52,
§ 540(B) (Supp. 1989) (repealing OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 567, 568 (Supp. 1988)).
This language is basically a legislative compromise between the opposing forces in the Sun case.




50. Id. at 2362.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2361.
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value for resolving future disputes as it does not address the process by
which division orders are formed, the nature of the instrument or the
scope of authority of the lessee as agent for the royalty owners.5 3 The
opinion will probably be used by royalty owners to support their position
that division orders are not required to be executed as a precedent to
receiving royalty payment in states where statutes like Oklahoma's exist,
and by purchasers to support their position that the common law re-
quires that division orders be executed prior to receiving royalty pay-
ments pursuant to trade custom and usage in the industry. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court did the Texas two-step, avoiding any decision
of the hard issues and providing the practitioner with little guidance for
resolving future disputes.
VI. EFFECT OF EXECUTION OF DIVISION ORDERS
A. Common Elements of a Division Order
To a large extent, the effect of the execution of a division order de-
pends on the covenants, terms, and provisions of the division order.54
While there currently exists no standard or model form division order,
there are core terms that have remained relatively constant over the
years.5" Core terms found in virtually every division order are as follows:
(1) A warranty or certification of the title of the owner to the inter-
est shown in the division order;
(2) Terms relating to the delivery of the product and transfer of title
to purchaser;
(3) Terms setting forth the price and the time and method of
payment;
(4) A description of the property covered by the division order;
(5) Provisions for furnishing evidence of title and granting the pur-
chaser the right to suspend payment in the event of conflicting claims;
and
(6) Provisions requiring the owner to provide the purchaser with
written notice of changes or transfers of ownership.56
53. Professor David E. Pierce expressed his hope that the court would use this case to expound
upon these more difficult issues. Pierce, supra note 1, at 3-27.
54. See Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Scurlock Oil Co., 447 F.2d 997, 1003 n.9 (5th Cir. 1971); Lowe,
Developments In Non-Regulatory Oil and Gas Law, 39 INST. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N 1-1, 1-21 to
-22 (1988).
55. Compare Ethridge, supra note 1, at 129-30 with Holliman, supra note 1, at 316.
56. See Brannan supra note 1, at 12-9 to -10; Holliman, supra note 1, at 316; Hooper &
Schleier, supra note 1, at 542-43; Twenhafel, supra note 1, at 1488-89.
[Vol. 25:571
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 25 [1989], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss3/3
DIVISION ORDERS
In addition to the above terms, most division orders in current use
also contain language purporting to ratify the lease and perhaps the gas
contract, minimum payment provisions, specific terms as to revocability,
terms that bind the parties to the division order regardless of whether all
of the named interest owners sign, authorization to make certain deduc-
tions from the purchase price, and provisions extending the division or-
der to the heirs, successors and assigns of the parties executing it.57
Although the basic terms of the division order have remained unchanged
over at least the last fifty years, the division order itself seems to have
grown and lengthened with the body of case law interpreting the rights of
purchasers and sellers of production. As certain problems arise through
litigation, such as the obligation to pay royalty based on market value,
new clauses have been added in an attempt to deal with these problems
through the terms of the division order. Seldom are any clauses
deleted."
B. Revocability of Division Orders
As a general rule, most division orders are by their specific language
made revocable at the will of either party. This is almost universally true
as to division orders covering the purchase of oil. Some will provide
forty-eight hours notice and others, thirty or sixty days notice. Com-
monly, oil division orders will begin with the language "until further
written notice from you or from the undersigned" you are entitled to
purchase the interest covered by the division order. When the language
of the division order itself clearly manifests the parties' intention that it
may be revocable by either party, this intention will be enforced by the
courts.5 9
When the division order by its terms is not explicitly made revoca-
ble, however, the cases are not so clear as to a royalty owner's right to
revoke a division order. Gas division orders, in particular, will fre-
quently provide that they shall be in force and effect for a stated period of
time, for the life of the lease, or so long as the gas sales contract is in
57. See Brannan supra note 1, at 12-9 to -10; Holliman, supra note 1, at 316; Hooper &
Schleier, supra note 1, at 542-43; Twenhafel, supra note 1, at 1488-89.
58. Most division orders still retain a clause requiring that full and complete abstracts of title be
furnished by the seller upon the request of the purchaser though purchasers have relied on Division
Order Title Opinions from outside attorneys for years and most sellers no longer have abstracts of
their property. Also, virtually every division order currently in use in Mississippi and Alabama
retains the clause authorizing the purchaser to withhold money without interest even though this is
prohibited by statutes in both states.
59. See Boyd, supra note 1, at 256; Holliman, supra note 1, at 320-21.
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effect. There are several cases in various jurisdictions that hold that divi-
sion orders can be made irrevocable, either by the specific language of the
division order or by the language coupled with the actions of the par-
ties.' ° However, more recent decisions in Texas have apparently found
this line of authority unpersuasive6 1 In Exxon Corp. v. Middleton,62
some of the division orders at issue expressly provided that they would
remain in effect for the life of the leases and set out the formula to be
used in calculating royalties for gas proceeds to be distributed pursuant
to the division order. 3 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the
division orders were valid written agreements modifying the gas royalty
clause of the lease and that the royalty owners were not entitled to revoke
or rescind the orders unilaterally."M The Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals without any discussion as to the issue of whether some
of the division orders had been made irrevocable. The court declared
that the division orders had been revoked by the filing of suit by the
royalty owners, but that the lessees to whom the division orders were
directed were protected as to royalty settlements made until such revoca-
tion.65 The court noted that the division orders did not refer to any spe-
cific gas contracts and simply declared that they were revocable at will.
The court failed to state why.
C. Payments Made Pursuant to Division Orders
As a general rule payments made pursuant to a division order,
whether by third-party purchasers or lessees, are binding upon the roy-
alty interest owner until the division order is revoked, at least to the ex-
tent that all funds due the royalty interest owners have been paid out to
others.66 Although in such situations the purchaser will be protected, a
60. Union Producing Co. v. Driskell, 117 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1941) (gas division order which
specifically provided that royalty owner's gas was to be sold to pipeline; lessee drilled additional
wells in reliance thereon); Simpson v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 196 Miss. 356, 17 So. 2d 200 (1944)
(gas division order incorporating gas sales contract executed to third party purchaser who relied and
acted thereon); Headley v. Hoopergarner, 60 W. Va. 626, 55 S.E. 744 (1906) (oil division order-no
terms of instrument given). The court's analysis in Simpson was criticized by Judge Ethridge in his
seminal article on division orders. See Ethridge, supra note 1. Also, the courts in both Simpson and
Union Producing Co. appear to have based their decisions primarily on the actions of the parties in
reliance on the division orders.
61. See, eg., Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Butler v. Exxon Corp.,
559 S.W.2d 410 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
62. 613 S.W.2d 240 (rex. 1981).
63. Id. at 247-250.
64. Id. at 250.
65. Id. at 250-51.
66. See, eg., Dale v. Case, 217 Miss. 298, 64 So. 2d 344 (1953); Cabot Corp. v. Brown, 754
S.W.2d 104 (rex. 1987); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Chicago Corp. v.
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royalty owner who has executed a division order that credits the royalty
owner with a lesser interest than is actually owned may assert a claim for
unjust enrichment against the party who was overpaid.67
In a recent decision by the Texas Supreme Court, Gavenda v. Strata
Energy, Inc. ,68 the Texas Supreme Court modified the general rule that
settlements made pursuant to division orders are binding until the divi-
sion orders are revoked. In Gavenda, the landowner had conveyed a
tract of land reserving an undivided one-half non-participating term roy-
alty interest in the property. The holder of the executive rights subse-
quently executed an oil and gas lease providing for a lessor's royalty of
one-eighth. Division orders were prepared by the lessee/operator which
erroneously credited the Gavendas with an undivided one-sixteenth roy-
alty interest rather than a one-half royalty interest pursuant to a division
order title opinion by the lessee's attorney. The Gavendas executed the
division orders and accepted payment thereunder for several years. Two
days before the Gavendas' term royalty interest was to expire, the
Gavendas revoked the division order and subsequently filed suit demand-
ing payment of some $2.4 million in underpaid royalties owed them
under the one-half term royalty interest reserved by them.69 The parties
stipulated that the deed reserved a full one-half royalty, or one-half of
gross production. The operator, Strata, had apparently sold some over-
riding royalty and some of its working interest ownership.
The Texas Supreme Court stated that the only issue was whether,
under the facts of the case, the division orders were binding until re-
voked.70 The Texas Supreme Court reviewed its general jurisprudence
that division orders bind underpaid royalty owners until they are re-
voked. The court explained that the reasoning underlying this rule was
the detrimental reliance of the purchasers and operators and declared
that when the purchaser or operator has paid out all of the proceeds
owed pursuant to the division orders, but errs in the distribution of these
Wall, 156 Tex. 217, 293 S.W.2d 844 (1956). But see Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 233 Kan. 544, 664
P.2d 1335 (1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985) and Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corp., 222 Kan. 733,
567 P.2d 1326 (1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978) (execution of division orders which attempt
to alter the lease provisions will not deprive the royalty owner of the amounts due under the lease-
Kansas is an exception to the general rule).
67. Hershey v. Hershey, 3 Il. App. 2d 307, 122 N.E.2d 69 (1954); Dale v. Case, 217 Miss. 298,
64 So. 2d 344 (1953); Hafeman v. Gem Oil Co., 163 Neb. 438, 80 N.W.2d 139 (1956). Of course, the
overpaid party may still be able to interpose equitable defenses such as waiver, estoppel and laches
against any claim should the facts warrant them.
68. 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986).
69. Id. at 691.
70. Id. at 690.
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proceeds, it should be protected from any double liability for the amount
of the overpayment. 71 The court stated that because the purchasers and
operators have relied on the division order representations without per-
sonal benefit from the errors, they should be protected. In such circum-
stances, no unjust enrichment exists.72 However, applying the law to the
facts of the Gavenda case, the Texas Supreme Court held that the divi-
sion orders and the payments made pursuant thereto were not binding on
the Gavendas:
Strata both erroneously prepared the division and transfer orders and
distributed the royalties. Because of its error, Strata underpaid the
Gavenda family by 7/16th royalty, retaining part of the 7/16th royalty
for itself. It profited, unlike the operators in Exxon v. Middleton, at
the royalty owner's expense. It retained for itself... part of the pro-
ceeds owed to the royalty owners. Therefore, Strata is liable to the
Gavendas for whatever portion of their royalties it retained, although
it is not liable to the Gavendas for any of their royalties it paid out to
various overriding or other royalty owners.73
After remand, the Court of Appeals declined to give Strata credit
for payments to overriding royalty and working interest owners who
were assignees of Strata.74 Strata was allowed credit only for the royalty
payments made to lessor royalty owners.75 Apparently, the court de-
cided that because Strata had sold the overriding royalty and working
interest, it had thereby profited at the Gavendas' expense and could not
receive credits for the payments made to its assignees.
D. Market Value Litigation and Responses of Lessees Thereto
Much litigation was spawned in the late 1960s, 1970s and early
1980s between royalty owners and lessee/purchasers over the payment of
gas royalties based on current market value, as provided in many stan-
dard lease forms, as opposed to the net proceeds received by the lessee by
virtue of its long-term gas sales contract. Because of the nature of mar-
keting gas and the regulatory restrictions placed on gas purchasers and
71. Id. at 692.
72. Id. Professor Lowe is mystified by the distinctions relating to division orders made by the
Texas Supreme Court, finding Gavenda irreconcilable with Exxon v. Middleton. See Lowe, supra
note 54, at 1-22 n. 82. He is not alone. Strata, who paid the royalty owner a lesser interest than he
was entitled to, is not protected, while Exxon and Sun, who paid the royalty owners a lesser value
than they were entitled to, are. The distinction is a fine one.
73. Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d at 692-93.
74. Strata Energy, Inc. v. Gavenda, 753 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988).
75. Id. at 790.
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producers, gas has been marketed until recently under long-term con-
tracts. In the "market value royalty litigation," the royalty owners ar-
gued that their leases provided that they be paid the market value of the
gas when produced, regardless of the price received by the producer
under its long-term contract. Producers, quite naturally, contended that
the contract price entered into at an arm's length basis is the market
value and the proper basis on which royalty payments should be made.
The results of this litigation have been mixed. Texas,7 6 Kansas,77
Mississippi, 78 (and probably Montana, 79 North Dakota, and West Vir-
ginia80) have favored the royalty owners, concluding that market value
royalty payment obligations may be based on a price greater (and per-
haps lower) 81 than the contract price. Oklahoma,82 Arkansas,83 and
Louisiana84 have rejected this view holding that in most circumstances
the proceeds received by a lessee under an arm's length gas sales contract
constitute the market value.
These "market value royalty" cases have caused considerable con-
sternation to producers of gas. To force lessees to pay royalty on prices
greater than they were receiving was felt by many commentators and all
producers to be rather harsh, although clearly supported by established
legal principles. The Texas Supreme Court in Middleton gave some pro-
tection to the lessee by virtue of the language of the division orders that
the royalty owners had executed. The Texas Supreme Court held that
these division orders were binding until revoked, even though they had
the effect of amending the lease royalty provisions to provide for pay-
ment of the lessor's royalty based on one-eighth of the price received by
the lessee, rather than one-eighth of the market value as provided in the
76. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela,
429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
77. Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 233 Kan. 544, 664 P.2d 1335 (1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953
(1985); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
78. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.Supp. 957 (S.D. Miss. 1982), aff'd
in part, rey'd in part, 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985) (court on
remand held that royalty owners failed to prove that market value of gas sold was any different than
contract price Shell paid, No. J74-0307(W) (S.D. Miss. April 24, 1989)).
79. Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 179 Mont. 87, 586 P.2d 298 (1978) (dicta-lessee was both
producer and purchaser).
80. Amerada Hess Corp. v. Conrad, 410 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1987) and Teavee Oil & Gas, Inc.
v. Hardesty, 297 S.E.2d 898 (W. Va. 1982) (Both cases held that tax statutes based on market value
of gas meant current market value and not contract price.).
81. See nfira p. 590.
82. Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
83. Hillard v. Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982).
84. Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
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lease.85
As a result of these market value royalty cases,8 6 many producers
have changed their division order forms in an effort to shield themselves
from liability for "excess" royalty obligations, i.e., having to pay royalty
on anything other than the price they received from the sale of produc-
tion. They have drafted certain clauses to attempt to achieve this result.
The exact approach chosen may have telling consequences for producers
and may present royalty owners with another grab at the golden ring. 7
The following division order provisions illustrate the different ap-
proaches taken by producers to address this matter:
Producer No. 1-You... are hereby granted the right, until further
written notice, to receive the oil and gas from said well... Gas re-
ceived under the provisions hereof shall be paid for to the party or
parties entitled thereto according to the schedule of interest shown
herein at the prices received by you for such gas.... Market value of
production at the well as that term is used in any of the oil, gas and
.mineral leases affecting the lands covered by this Division Order shall
be the price received by you under any sales contract entered into be-
tween you and any third party.
Producer No. 2-Each of the undersigned declares and agrees that you
are hereby authorized, until further written notice as herein provided,
to receive from each of the undersigned in the particular interest or
proportion credited to him, oil and gas, subject to the following terms
and conditions: ... The oil and gas received and purchased under the
provisions of this division order shall be paid to the owners set out
herein at... the sales price received by you less any applicable trans-
portation and marketing charges, and the undersigned agrees that this
price shall be conclusively presumed to be the market value at the well
of the oil and gas sold or used as provided for in the royalty provisions
of the oil, gas and mineral lease or leases through which payments are
made to the undersigned .... This division order is executed subject to
all applicable gas contracts. You may discontinue your authority to
purchase any oil hereunder by giving at least 48 hours prior written
notice. An interest owner may terminate this division order as to oil by
giving you at least 48 hours prior written notice.
Producer No. 3-Settlements for gas and/or casinghead gas produced
from the property covered by this Division Order shall be based upon
the net proceeds received by the working interest owners from the sale
85. Exxon Corp v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1981).
86. Many division order forms were changed after the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), which held that the Federal Power Commission
had the power to regulate the price received by a producer selling in interstate commerce. See
Hooper & Schleier, supra note 1, at 537-39.
87. Or fleece, depending on one's point of view. See infra pp. 590-93.
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of such gas and/or casinghead gas computed at the wells. You are
authorized to deduct from such proceeds the cost incurred in com-
pressing, treating, dehydrating and transporting such gas and/or cas-
inghead gas for delivery in computing the net proceeds at the wells
payable as royalty.... Each of the Owners who owns a royalty inter-
est (landowner's royalty) in the property hereinabove described, by the
execution of this Division Order, hereby adopts, ratifies and confirms
each oil and gas lease, and each gas purchase contract, together with
any amendments thereof, to which this Division Order applies. ... This
contract shall remain in full force and effect until cancelled by any
party hereto upon giving 60 days written notice in advance of any such
cancellation.
Producer No. 4-[U]ntil further written notice from you or from us,
the undersigned owners ... authorize you ... to receive such sales
[from the named well] and to give credit as set forth on Exhibit A...
Settlement shall be based on the net proceeds at the well as determined
by the price and on the terms stated in that certain gas sale contract to
XYZ Pipeline Company from ABC Production Company dated Novem-
ber 1, 1979 and amended August 1, 1980, and any renewals or modifi-
cations thereof applicable to the property covered hereby; and the
undersigned ratify said gas sales contract.88
Producer No. 1 attempts to amend or at least elucidate the lease
royalty terms to stipulate that the "market value" of the production shall
be the price received by the lessee under any gas sales contract. How-
ever, the division order clearly remains revocable.
Producer No. 2 generally adopts the same approach as No. 1, but
goes somewhat further. It purports to make the division order "subject
to" the applicable gas sales contract. The division order is specifically
made revocable as to oil, but is silent as to gas, thus implying that it may
not be revocable as to gas sales.
Producer No. 3 simply stipulates that settlements for gas sales made
under the division order shall be based upon net proceeds, but does not
attempt to define or clarify the term "market value." The division order
is explicitly made revocable, but the royalty owner adopts and ratifies the
gas sales contract. Thus, the ratification of the gas sales contract may
make the division order irrevocable as to gas sales.
The last division order resembles No. 3, but is far more specific. It
specifies that settlement shall be based on the price and terms of a desig-
nated gas sales contract and requires the royalty owners to ratify that
contract. The division order does contain the language "until further
88. These are provisions in division orders from four producers, all of whom are selling gas
from the same South Mississippi field to three different gas purchasers.
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written notice"; such language is normally deemed to make the division
order revocable. The ratification of a specific gas contract, however, may
make the division order irrevocable as to gas sales.
What effect on the obligation of producers to pay royalty do the
above division orders have? The "market value" cases arose and were
decided in a period of rising prices. The litigation was prompted by a
rising market price and lower long-term contract prices. The market
forces that have been allowed to work have now swung the pendulum
and the current market value is frequently below many of the contract
prices. The legal reasoning supporting most of the decisions that granted
royalty owners the right to receive a royalty payment based on a current
market value higher than the contract price supports the converse situa-
tion equally. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has said as much in Piney Woods
Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., stating: "If the price of gas declines,
a market value royalty clause would benefit a lessee who has contracted
to sell gas at a favorable price."89
There are no cases directly on point. Most lessees appear to be pay-
ing the contract price although some undoubtedly are paying a lower
market value price. Under the reasoning of the Middleton court, all of
the above lessees would appear to have to account to royalty owners on
the basis of the prices they received and could not make payment at a
lower current market value price without revoking the terms of the divi-
sion orders. 90
E. The Rights of Royalty Owners to Share in Take-or-Pay Settlements
What market value litigation was to the 1970s and 1980s, royalty
owners' claims to share in take-or-pay payments or settlements will be
for the 1990s. Many gas sales contracts executed in the late 1970s and
early 1980s contain what is known as a take-or-pay provision. These
clauses generally require the pipeline purchaser either to take (and pay
for at the contract price) a specified quantity of natural gas during each
contract year (or month), or to pay for the contract minimum quantity
regardless of whether it is taken. The purchaser is required to pay for
any deficient takes at the end of the contract year and is then allowed to
recoup the take-or-pay payments made by taking makeup gas at a later
89. 726 F.2d 225, 236 n.14 (5th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
90. We could be faced with the ironic situation of attorneys for royalty owners adopting the
arguments of gas producers set out in the market value royalty cases and attorneys for producers
responding with the royalty owners' former arguments.
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date. As the pipelines' take-or-pay obligations began to mount, pipelines,
by and large, refused to make further take-or-pay payments and fre-
quently unilaterally reduced both the takes and the prices paid for the
gas that was taken.91
The actions of the pipelines have spawned a cottage industry for gas
contract litigators. The pipelines have paid out huge sums in take-or-pay
payments, and even greater sums in take-or-pay settlements and damage
awards. 92 Billions of dollars still remain in dispute and many more set-
tlements or court adjudications will be made in the near future as the
pipelines work their way out of their take-or-pay liabilities. Royalty
owners and their enterprising attorneys are about as likely to sit back and
make no claims to share in these take-or-pay monies as they were content
to receive below market value prices when gas prices were shooting up.93
Indeed, the first shots fired in Round 2 of the take-or-pay wars were
by the United States government. In Diamond Shamrock Exploration
Corp. v. Hodel,94 the Fifth Circuit consolidated and then reconciled con-
flicting cases from two Louisiana district courts and held that royalties to
the United States were not due on take-or-pay payments received by pro-
ducers under the terms of the government leases involved. The court
ruled that royalties are not owed unless and until there is actual produc-
tion, the physical severance of minerals from the ground.95 Many gas
producers who have recently received major take-or-pay settlements
breathed a little easier after the Diamond Shamrock decision. However,
it is too early to tell how persuasive the Fifth Circuit decision will be to
other courts that consider the issue.96 The Diamond Shamrock case
91. See generally Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, Take or Litigate: Enforcing the Plain Meaning
of the Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REv. 185 (1987).,
92. See, eg., Redhill Development Co. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., a Texas state court
decision discussed in Natural Resources Law Newsletter, Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1989. (The jury
awarded $700 million to the plaintiff. The matter was subsequently settled prior to appeal.) See also
Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing S.E., Inc. v. FERC, 885 F.2d 209, 235 n.19 (5th Cir. 1989)
(Judge Brown notes that eight pipelines have reached in the aggregate over $3.9 billion in settlement
of take-or-pay liability.).
93. Of course, the vast majority of royalty owners did not, in fact, sue their lessees to obtain a
higher price than the lessee was receiving for gas sales, even though their lease clauses may have
justified such a suit. However, there were enough suits brought to cause major revisions to the forms
of leases and division orders.
94. 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
95. Id. at 1168.
96. A Wyoming court reached the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit, holding that no royalty
was due the State of Wyoming under a state lease for take-or-pay payments since no gas was "pro-
duced" as provided in the lease royalty clause. State v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1988);
accord Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 708 F.Supp. 783 (E.D. La. 1989).
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dealt with a federal lease, the interpretation of the federal lease provi-
sions, and pertinent regulations. For that reason alone, it may be distin-
guishable from cases involving privately owned lands. One of today's
pre-eminent oil and gas authorities, Professor John Lowe, concluded that
"if the issue is decided by reference to literal lease terms, royalty owners
probably should not share in take-or-pay payments."97 But, as Professor
Lowe pointed out, many courts when interpreting oil and gas leases look
beyond the literal terms of the lease and focus on the broader general
intention of the parties.9" Many obligations not mentioned in the lease
contract are implied by the courts, such as the implied covenant to mar-
ket on the best available terms. It does not take a cosmic leap to con-
clude that the lessor may also be entitled to share in all the benefits of the
lessee's marketing arrangements. 99
What effect will an executed division order containing language as
recited above have on the obligation of producers to share with royalty
owners the fruits of their take-or-pay settlements or payments from the
pipelines? A strong argument can certainly be made that the royalty
owners in the first two division orders above are made third-party benefi-
ciaries of the gas contracts. In the last two division orders, the royalty
owners specifically ratify, and thus become parties to, the gas sales con-
tract. The last division order additionally provides that the royalty own-
ers ratify a specific named, dated, and identifiable gas sales contract.
Would not a party to the contract have a right to receive all of the bene-
fits pursuant to the contract?
Courts have bound lessors to the terms of gas sales contracts which
have been ratified by division orders."o There appears to be no reported
decision where the issue of division orders entitling a royalty owner to
share in take-or-pay payments or settlements has been adjudicated. No
97. Lowe, Current Lease and Royalty Problems in the Gas Industry, 23 TULSA L.J. 547, 563
(1988). See also Kramer, Royalty Obligations Under the Gun--The Effect of Take-or-Pay Clauses on
the Duty to Make Royalty Payments, 39 INsT. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N, Ch. 5 (1988); Smith,
supra note 8, at 513.
98. Lowe, supra note 97 at 563.
99. Lowe, supra note 97, at 563. Royalty owners will also undoubtedly argue that take-or-pay
payments are nothing more than prepayments for production to be taken at a later date. Advance
royalty payments for minerals to be mined at a later date have long been common in the mining
industry. Also, the manner in which the lessee has paid royalties on entitlements or actual takes
could affect the outcome of royalty obligation on take-or-pay payments. For a concise discussion of
royalty owners' claims to take-or-pay proceeds and the effect of division orders thereon, see Smith,
supra note 8, at 543-45.
100. Simpson v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 196 Miss. 356, 17 So. 2d 200 (1944); Koenning v.
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producer is known by this writer that has shared take-or-pay payments
with its royalty owners. The settlement of take-or-pay litigation fre-
quently involves amendments to, or a buy-down or buy-out of, the gas
contract. In all probability, a royalty owner would be entitled to share in
such a settlement.101 Where the royalty owner is a party to the contract
by virtue of its ratification in the division order, the royalty owner should
certainly be entitled to participate in the fruits of a contract settlement.
Some producers have shared at least a portion, if not all, of these gas
contract settlements with their royalty owners. Others have shared noth-
ing. Whether the royalty owners are legally entitled to share in these
payments and settlements under the lease royalty clause, the general im-
plied terms of the lease or pursuant to division orders, will undoubtedly
be widely litigated in the coming years.
F. Right to Interest on Suspended Funds
Division orders almost universally authorize the purchaser to sus-
pend funds upon certain stated conditions without any obligation for in-
terest. A typical division order provision dealing with interest reads as
follows:
Satisfactory abstracts or other evidence of title will be furnished to you
at any time on demand. In the event of a failure to so furnish such
evidence of title, or in the event of a claim or controversy, which in
your opinion concerns title to any interest hereunder, you may hold
the proceeds of all oil and withhold payments on all gas received by
you hereunder, without interest and without any liability, until indem-
nity satisfactory to you has been furnished or until such claim or con-
troversy has been settled to your satisfaction.
In three companion cases decided in the 1930s,1 2 the Tenth Circuit
approved a purchaser's withholding of payments without obligation to
pay interest to the lessor pending the resolution of title litigation. The
lessor had refused to execute a division order to the third-party pur-
chaser. The lessor sued claiming interest on the suspended royalties.
The court looked to the common law and the usage generally adopted by
101. Lowe, supra note 97, at 563; Smith, supra note 8, at 544. But see Gerard J. W. Bos & Co.,
Inc. v. Harkins & Co., 883 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1989) (court held no fiduciary duty arose with respect
to marketing by the unit operator by virtue of Mississippi Oil & Gas Board's force integration order,
and that royalty owner had no claim against unit operator, who was not his lessee, for unit opera-
tor's settlement of its gas contract dispute with the pipeline).
102. Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 299 U.S. 553 (1936); Wolfe v.
Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 83 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1936); Wolfe v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 83 F.2d 438
(10th Cir.), cerL denied, 299 U.S. 553 (1936).
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those in the business of producing, marketing, and purchasing crude oil,
and ruled that in cases in which the title was in dispute, the purchaser
had a right to suspend the funds without liability for interest. Early
Texas cases also upheld the right of the purchaser to suspend funds with-
out obligation to pay interest when the division orders have provided that
the purchaser could suspend payments in the event of a title dispute and
no indemnity was furnished. 103
However, in Kansas and Louisiana it is clear that the purchaser is
not authorized to suspend royalties without obligation for interest." In
Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corp.,1°5 the Kansas Supreme Court held:
It was the duty of Gulf under the lease contracts it had with its
royalty owners to market the gas at the best prices obtainable at the
place where the gas was produced. The insertion in the division orders
of matters contrary to the oil and gas leases, or contrary to the law,
cannot be unilaterally imposed upon the lessor by the lessee or the
purchaser. Here the unilateral attempt by Gulf in the division orders
to amend the oil and gas leases, and thereby deprive the royalty owners
of interest to which they were otherwise entitled, was without consid-
eration. Therefore, the provisions in the division order regarding
waiver of interest are null and void as determined by the trial court. 106
Although the Maddox case involved a division order from a lessee, the
court indicated that the same rule would have applied had the division
order been from a third-party purchaser.I17
In a poorly reasoned opinion with egregious results for the royalty
owner, the New Mexico Supreme Court recently held in Murdock v.
Pure-Lively Energy 1981-A, Ltd. 108 that an oil purchaser did not owe the
royalty owner interest on proceeds withheld pending resolution of a title
dispute. The linchpin of the Court's decision was the royalty owner's
execution of a division order. The royalty owner's title was challenged
before the well in question had been drilled and the operator/purchaser,
103. Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Nearen, 135 Tex. 50, 138 S.W.2d 1065 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1940,
opinion adopted); Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Mann, 135 Tex. 49, 138 S.W.2d 1069 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1940, opinion adopted); accord, Lasater v. Convest Energy Corp., 615 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e).
104. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan. 195, 218-20, 679 P.2d 1159, 1179-80 (1984),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corp., 222 Kan. 733, 567 P.2d
1326 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978); Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.
2d 715 (La. App.), writ ref'd, 250 La. 898, 199 So. 2d 915 (1967).
105. 222 Kan. 733, 567 P.2d 1326 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978).
106. Id. at 735, 567 P.2d at 1328.
107. Id.
108. 108 N.M. 575, 775 P.2d 1292 (1989). This case is a perfect illustration of why many royalty
owners are leery of signing any division order.
[Vol. 25:571
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Conoco, had suspended payment.10 9 The royalty owner filed a quiet title
action and was eventually successful in having the adverse claims dis-
missed. Conoco prepared a division order after the royalty owner had
partially extinguished the adverse claim (and thus, a considerable time
after the well had been producing and Conoco had been purchasing the
oil) covering one-half of the royalty owner's interest. The royalty owner
deleted the standard form provision which authorized Conoco to suspend
proceeds without liability for interest. Conoco then paid the royalty
owner one-half of the suspended proceeds without any interest. A few
months later, Conoco sent the royalty owner an "amended division or-
der" covering the remainder of his interest,110 which division order "re-
stored the unauthorized deletion which Murdock made in the first
Conoco-Murdock division order and provided that Conoco could with-
hold royalty payments without interest." ' This division order was exe-
cuted, and Conoco paid the proceeds for the remaining royalty without
any interest. The royalty owner sued to recover interest for the period
his royalty was suspended. The Court held that under the terms of the
second division order, Conoco did not owe the royalty owner interest on
the proceeds suspended pending resolution of the title dispute."1 a The
Court in dicta indicated that even if the division order had not specifi-
cally provided that Conoco did not owe the royalty owner interest,
"under the common law some courts hold interest would not be
owed,"11 citing Gulf Pipe Line Company v. Nearen.114
The Murdock court's dicta concerning the common law is somewhat
misleading. Courts may frequently state as a rule that prejudgment in-
terest is not allowed under that name unless provided for by contract or
statute, but then proceed to approve exceptions based on equity. 15
The Texas cases116 and those of other common law juris-
109. A claim was also involved on wells where another party was the operator and Conoco, as
purchaser, had paid the royalty proceeds to the operator who then suspended them. A judgment
against this operator was rendered by the trial court and no appeal made. The operator must have
been unable to adequately satisfy this judgment since the plaintiff sought to hold Conoco liable for
interest on these proceeds as well.
110. The Court's opinion is not precisely clear as to whether the second division order was only
for the remaining one-half of the royalty owner's interest or purported to cover the entirety of his
interest and, thus, supersede the first division order. The Court treated it as if it were the latter.
111. Murdock, 108 N.M. at _, 775 P.2d at 1295.
112. Id. at _, 775 P.2d at 1297.
113. Id.
114. 135 Tex. 50, 138 S.W.2d 1065 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1940, opinion adopted).
115. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480, 486 (Tex. 1978).
116. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hazlewood, 534 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1976); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 370 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Texas courts... realize that the right to interest is a
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dictions1 17 overwhelmingly support the right of the royalty owner to be
paid interest on suspended funds. The common law provides that inter-
est will be due when a party suspending funds has retained and used or
commingled those funds based upon the equitable doctrine for use and
detention of money." The court in Murdock recognized that Conoco
owed the royalty owner a duty of "utmost good faith," but concluded
that it had no duty to pay the royalty owner interest for the detention of
the money.119 A reasonably prudent operator would not place its own
surplus funds in a non-interest bearing account so that only the bank
could enjoy the interest from the use of the funds. The operator should
have a duty to the royalty owner to treat these funds in the same manner
as it would its own. The question is not whether interest should be paid
on suspended proceeds, but rather who is entitled to this interest, the
owner of the money or its custodian. The courts should always allow the
royalty owner the right to receive interest on suspended proceeds unless
there has been a clear waiver of that right, supported by valid
consideration.
Many states now have statutes which require interest penalties for
sums not timely paid to royalty owners.1 20 However, these statutes are
marketplace concept and that the use of money is a mercantile privilege which should not go uncom-
pensated, absent countervailing considerations."); Fuller v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 408 F.Supp. 643
(N.D. Tex. 1976); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1978) (The
Texas courts have not insisted on statutory rigidity in the allowance of interest when necessary to
permit compensation for the use or detention of one's money); MCZ, Inc. v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 672,
677 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("court can award prejudgment interest
upon equitable principles to compensate one for another's possession and use of his funds");
DeBenavides v. Warren, 674 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oldland, 187 F.2d 780, 783 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816
(1951). (Court of Appeals applying Colorado law found interest on suspended proceeds should be
allowed on equitable principles due to the wrongful retention of royalty. The court stated that "[t]he
mere fact that the validity of the claim was in dispute does not preclude the recovery of interest.")
Id. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 240 Kan. 764, 732 P.2d 1286 (1987), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
108 S.Ct. 2883 (1988) (class action suit wherein Kansas Supreme Court applied the laws of Texas,
Oklahoma, Louisiana, New Mexico and Wyoming and found interest required on suspended royalty
funds); Schaffer v. Tenneco Oil Co., 278 Ark. 511, 647 S.W.2d 446 (1983); Holmes v. Kewanee Oil
Co., 233 Kan. 544, 664 P.2d 1335 (1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985); Bennion v. Utah State
Bd. of Oil, Gas & Minerals, 675 P.2d 1135, 1144 (Utah 1983); Cf. Dilworth v. Fortier, 405 P.2d 38
(Okla. 1964); State Highway Comm'n v. Wunderlich, 194 Miss. 119, 11 So. 2d 437 (1943).
118. See supra notes 116-17; see also Lear, supra note 1, at 17-49.
119. Murdock v. Pure-Lively Energy 1981-A, Ltd., 108 N.M. 575, 775 P.2d 1292 (N.M. 1989).
Conoco, in addition to purchasing production from the wells, owned an unleased mineral interest
that was subject to a non-participating royalty interest owned by Murdock.
120. See ALA. CODE § 9-17-33 (Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 15-74-601 to -04 (1987); IND.
CODE ANN. § 32-5-9-1 (Burns 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:212.23 (West 1989); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 53-3-39 (Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-103 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN 1978 § 70-
10-1 to -5 (Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.1 (Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 540
(Supp. 1989); TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 91.401-.406 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN.
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by no means identical,12' and the particular statute should be consulted
to see precisely what it provides as to when interest is due and whether
the right may be waived in a division order. Mississippi, after initially
enacting its royalty owner interest bill in 1983, amended the statute two
years later to provide that interest on undisbursed royalty may not be
waived or reduced by a royalty owner entitled to such interest payment
"unless said royalty owner shall attest to a statement which shall be
typed in bold print on a separate form and attached to the relevant divi-
sion order contract" specifically agreeing to waive the statutory right to
interest by language as set out in the statute.'22 Thus, in Mississippi, the
language in the form division orders currently in use waiving interest on
suspended funds is ineffective.
G. Effect of Division Order on Specific Lease Terms
When a division order is directed to the lessee, it is generally held
that the lessee cannot amend the lease terms or execute a division order
to escape obligations or liabilities under the lease.'23 Courts that hold
that the lessee cannot amend the terms of the lease by language in the
division order generally support this reasoning on a failure of considera-
tion being passed between the parties to support a royalty owner's relin-
quishment of his rights. 124 However, as evident in Middleton and other
market value royalty cases, the royalty provisions under the lease have
been effectively amended by division orders at least while the division
orders remain unrevoked and the parties act pursuant thereto.'25 Also,
the more specific terms of a division order often will be used to
supplement less specific language of a lease.' 26  In a recent Texas
§ 40-6-9 (Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-5-301 to -303 (1983). In spite of such statutes, many pur-
chasers will not pay interest on delinquent royalty payments unless the royalty owner specifically
demands the payment of interest.
121. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.3 ("Royalty payments may not be withheld because
an interest owner has not executed a division order.") with N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 70-10-5 (pen-
alty provisions do not apply if royalty owner does not execute division order). The New Mexico
statute is of limited value to royalty owners because it provides that the penalty provision shall not
apply if the person entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute the payor's "customary and
reasonable" division order. Purchasers' customary division orders allow them to suspend proceeds
without liability for interest.
122. MISS. CODE ANN. § 53-3-39 (Supp. 1989).
123. E. BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES, § 16.02, at 16-86 (2d ed. 1985); M. MER-
RILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAs LEASES, § 209A (2d ed. Supp. 1964); Hollimon, supra
note 1, at 345-46.
124. See, eg., Maddox v. Gulf Oil Co., 222 Kan. 733, 567 P.2d 1326 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1065 (1978).
125. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1981).
126. Twenhafel, supra note 1, at 1504-05.
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decision, 12 7 the court refused to relieve lessees from payment of royalty
where the operator/purchaser to whom division orders had been directed
defaulted in payments due, stating:
[Our cases] do not excuse the lessees from payment of the lessors' roy-
alty merely because there have been division orders executed by the
lessors in favor of a purchaser of the leasehold oil and gas. We know
of no authority that permits such use of a division order without ex-
press provision in the order for it.
128
Frequently, division orders will contain language explicitly ratifying
the oil, gas, and mineral lease under which the production is sold. Even
in the absence of specific language of ratification, courts have held that
execution of division orders and acceptance of royalty payments pursu-
ant thereto can serve to ratify a lease. 129
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
The major problem encountered by royalty owners in executing di-
vision orders is the fear that the rights reserved to them under their lease
will somehow be diminished, amended, modified or otherwise altered.
As we have seen, this fear is not always unjustified.
One method of alleviating this fear is to insert a special provision in
whatever lease form is executed by the mineral owner. One mineral
owner who prepared a lease form included a provision that reads as
follows:
If, in the event of production, a division order is circulated by lessee or
by a purchaser of production, such division order will be a simple
statement of interest containing no warranty or indemnity clauses and
containing no clauses modifying in any way the terms of this lease.
The insertion of any such clauses in a division order will be of no force
and effect.
No potential lessee has refused to enter into a lease with this mineral
owner because of this provision. Professor David Pierce, in his excellent
127. Williams v. Baker Exploration Co., 767 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, writ ref'd).
128. Id. at 196. But see Hollimon, supra note 1, at 344-45, in which the author opines that oil
division orders may transfer to the purchaser all of the lessee's duty to account for royalty and Cook
v. Tompkins, 713 S.W.2d 417 (rex. App.-Eastland 1986) in which the court held that the implied
covenant to market was satisfied when the lessee delivered the royalty oil to the purchaser for lessor's
account and the lessee had no obligation to see that the royalty owner was actually paid.
129. See, eg., Texas & Pac. Coal and Oil Co. v. Kirtley, 288 S.W. 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926, writ
ref'd); Corey v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 72 Mont. 383, 233 P. 909, cert. denied, 268 U.S. 698 (1925);
see also Boyd, supra note 1, at 256; Brannan, supra note I, at § 12-18 to -19; Holliman, supra, note 1,
at 338-41; Pierce, supra note I, at 3-37 n. 165.
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article setting out a conceptual approach to resolving division order dis-
putes, suggests that the lessor should be eliminated from the marketing
transaction. He suggests drafting the oil and gas lease to vest title in the
lessee to all production with the authority to sell it to others and the duty
to account to the lessor based upon express and implied terms of the
lease.130 Thus, careful attention to drafting the terms of the lease can be
a solution to any potential problem posed by division orders.
Another solution for the royalty owner is to carefully review all sub-
mitted division orders and delete any offending clauses. Many mineral
owners send their attorneys division orders for review prior to their exe-
cution. Attorneys routinely strike through those clauses which purport
to amend the lease to the disadvantage of the lessor. While occasionally a
purchaser will object to deletions from its standard form division order,
most purchasers are willing to work with the royalty owners and are
agreeable to reasonable changes in their standard form. Few, if any, pur-
chasers refuse to allow any alteration of their standard form division or-
der. Also, as previously suggested, the lessor should insist on inserting
an express provision in the division order that while the purchaser is
authorized to buy the oil, the execution of the division order will in no
manner affect any of the terms of the lease or the lessor's rights in real
property in general. 131
Legislation is another possible solution to the problems of royalty
owners as sellers of production. Royalty owners are increasingly better
organized and are beginning to have statutes enacted which affect royalty
payment procedures. As previously discussed, statutes which require the
purchasers to disburse payments within a certain period of time and
make them liable for interest on funds not timely disbursed have been
enacted by several states in recent years. 132 Several states have recently
passed payment information statutes which require the first purchaser to
provide certain accounting information on the check stubs in a uniform
manner so royalty owners can tell precisely what interest they are being
paid and what deductions are being made from their interest. Louisiana,
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas all have statutes of this
nature. 133
A statute passed in the 1989 session of the Wyoming Legislature
provides that a division order may not alter or amend the terms of an oil
130. Pierce, supra note 1, at 3-49 to -51.
131. Rain, supra note 1, at 82.
132. See supra note 120.
133. See Lear, supra note 1, at 17-53 to -54 & n.209.
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and gas lease or other contractual agreement.1 34 The statute states that a
division order that attempts to so alter a lease or contract is invalid to
such extent, and that the terms of the lease or other contractual agree-
ment will control. This statute also provides penalties for any working
interest owner or agent who fails to provide royalty information in a
proper and timely manner. 135 A similar bill was passed in Oklahoma to
amend existing statutes to define a division order and to preclude a divi-
sion order from relieving the lessee of any liabilities or obligations under
an oil and gas lease.13 6
An effort is also being made by the National Association of Royalty
Owners and others to develop a Model Division Order Form. Working
interest owners have enjoyed the benefit of a Model Form Operating
Agreement for over thirty years. The Model Form Operating Agreement
has changed periodically to reflect experiences of operators and is often
amended by the parties. However, the basic model forms have facilitated
harmonious operation of jointly owned properties. Although there is cur-
rently no standard division order, many division order provisions are
common and not objectionable to royalty owners. Development of a
Model Form Division Order could help allay many fears that royalty
owners have. It is too early to tell how successful this effort will be.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Division order cases are the "Am. Jur." of oil and gas law. Quota-
tions can be found in the various cases to support almost any proposition.
Few generalizations can be made about the effects of "division orders"
because many different instruments masquerade under this label. Execu-
tion of a division order or even the refusal to do so may adversely affect a
royalty owner's rights. However, from a royalty owner's vantage point,
not all division orders are bad. Division orders may, in fact, provide roy-
alty owners with benefits under favorable gas contracts to which they
otherwise would not be entitled. Division orders can also be useful in
specifying royalty payment procedures that may only be vaguely set out
in a lease. In executing division orders, royalty owners should observe
the three R's. Read the division order before you write your name to it
and make sure the arithmetic adds up to the interest you claim.
134. Wyo. STAT. 30-5-305(a) (Supp. 1989).
135. Wyo. STAT. 30-5-303 (Supp. 1989).
136. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 540(B) (Supp. 1989).
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